Written for advanced undergraduate and graduate students, this is the first textbook on international relations theory to take a specifically game-theoretic approach to the subject, and provide the material needed for students to understand the subject thoroughly, from its basic foundations to more complex models. International relations theory is presented and analysed using simple games, which allow students to grasp the concepts and mechanisms involved with the rationalist approach without the distraction of complicated mathematics. Chapter exercises reinforce key concepts and guide students to extend the models discussed. Drawing examples from international security, international political economy, and environmental negotiations, this introductory textbook examines a broad array of topics in international relations courses, including state preferences, normal form games, bargaining, uncertainty and communication, multilateral cooperation, and the impact of domestic politics.
This is the first textbook to unify rationalist scholarship in international relations theory into a complete introduction, with consistent style, level and notation, rather than through a diverse set of articles, written at various levels and in various styles
Students do not need a strong background in game theory to engage with this text
Utility functions, equilibrium boundaries, cut-off points and other derived quantities are illustrated in figures
Chapter conclusions lead students to further research, through a discussion of how the basic models presented in the chapter have been developed in various directions, and where current research interest lies
Table of Contents
2. What states want
3. Varieties of strategic settings
5. Power change and war
6. Private information and war
7. Arms competition and war
8. Cooperation theory
9. Diplomacy and signaling
10. Multilateral cooperation
11. Domestic politics and international relations.
Andrew H. Kydd, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Andrew H. Kydd is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin where he teaches courses on international relations theory, game theory and international relations, nuclear weapons and world politics, terrorism and conflict resolution. He has published articles in the American Political Science Review, International Organization, World Politics, and International Security, and his first book, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, won the 2006 Conflict Processes Best Book Award.